This paper examines the relationship between party regulation, trust in political parties and partisanship in twenty-four European democracies in 2010. It tests two rival hypotheses, one suggesting that the regulation of political parties improves support for them among electorates, and the other arguing the opposite case that regulation inhibits support for parties. These hypotheses are tested using a multi-level modelling strategy which controls for a number of variables which might account for trust in parties and partisanship at the individual level. The evidence suggests that heavy regulation of political parties is associated with low levels of trust in parties and fewer partisans in these countries. The analysis uses cross sectional data and so definitive causal relationships cannot be fully identified, but the data implies that regulation by the state in the context of a severe economic recession could be having the effect of stifling support for political parties and weakening civil society.
Introduction
There are two prominent findings from comparative research into political parties in the advanced industrial democracies. The first is that parties are growing ever closer to the state, and are becoming, in effect, part of a state sponsored cartel (Katz and Mair, 1995; Detterbeck, 2005) . The second is that with some exceptions parties are losing their voluntary organisations and fewer party members and activists are found in these democracies over time (Katz et al. 1992; Mair and Van Biezen, 2001; Van Bizen, Mair and Poguntke, 2012) .
These findings have been linked together by the argument that activism and volunteering in political parties is declining because they are growing closer to the state. This idea is supported by evidence that states which heavily regulate their party systems have fewer party activists and members, other things being equal (Whiteley, 2011) . Essentially proximity to the state has the effect of smothering voluntary party organisations.
It can be argued that while the loss of grassroots volunteers in political parties is a very undesirable development because it weakens civil society, it is not fatal for the effectiveness of parties in these countries (Seyd and Whiteley, 1992; Dalton and Wattenberg, The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between government regulation of political parties, trust in political parties and the strength of partisanship in the advanced industrial democracies. The aim is to determine if the regulatory environment is weakening both partisanship and also trust in parties in the European democracies. This exercise uses data from the European Social Surveys conducted since 2002 when the first survey was carried out 1 . The paper begins by looking at trends in partisanship and trust in parties over time, and then goes on to model the individual level determinants of these variables in twenty-four countries using the 2010 European Social Survey data. This is followed by an investigation of the effects of regulation on partisanship and trust in parties using a multi-level modelling strategy with the assistance of data from the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) database on party finance and the Leiden database on party law in modern Europe 2 . remaining stable in one. The overall scores declined because the loss of partisans in some countries considerable outweighed the increase in others. These data are not consistent with the evidence on declining voluntary activity in parties which has occurred more or less everywhere ( Van Biezen, Mair and Poguntke, 2012) . However, one noticeable feature of Figure 3 is that the countries which have experienced the largest reductions in partisanship are those facing the greatest economic difficulties in the present period. These include the 'great recession'. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Krugman, 2012; Galbraith, 2012) . In contrast, countries like Germany and Switzerland which have experienced relatively mild recessions have seen an increase in the number of partisans over time.
Changes in Partisanship and Trust in Parties Over Time

The European Social Survey (ESS) is 'an academically-driven social survey designed to chart and explain the interaction between Europe's changing institutions and the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of its diverse populations' (ESS, 2012). It was established in
-- Figure 4 about hereChanges in trust in political parties charted in Figure 4 show a similar pattern to the changes in partisanship in Figure 3 . In this case twelve of the countries have experienced a decline in trust and nine have experienced an increase. In a repeat of the pattern found in 
The Determinants of Partisanship and Trust in Parties in 2010
The European Social Surveys are not panels and so we cannot model changes over time with the same respondents. However, we can draw on the literature in political science and apply it to the task of explaining variations in partisanship and party trust across Europe. This will be done using the 2010 ESS data with the assistance of four different models of political participation which have been developed in the literature. These are the valence, the cognitive engagement, the civic voluntarism and the social capital models, and they will be described briefly next.
The valence model has been utilised particularly in research into electoral choice (Clarke et al. 2004 (Clarke et al. , 2009 Whiteley et al. 2013) . The term valence was introduced by Donald Stokes in a seminal article which provided a comprehensive critique of the Downsian spatial model of party competition (Downs, 1957; Stokes, 1963) . He wrote:
I will call "valence-issues" those that merely involve the linking of the parties with some condition that is positively or negatively valued by the electorate'. (Stokes, 1963: 373) He went on to explain that valence issues arise when there is broad agreement about the desired policy outcomes among the public, such as low unemployment and inflation, strong economic growth and efficient public services. Voters will support the party that appears to offer the best chance of delivering a competent performance in these areas (Clarke et al. 2004: 8) . The valence model concentrates on policy delivery and is predominantly a theory about which party wins elections. However, it has wider implications in the contemporary situation facing many European states. Serious recession and an apparent inability of governments and the major political parties to deal with the problems arising from this, has the effect of extending valence concerns to the party system in general and even to the legitimacy of democracy. Systemic failure to deliver on the key policies which matter to voters can have the effect of weakening support for mainstream political parties of all types.
Clearly, both partisanship and party trust are likely to be influenced by the politics of performance in the present economic climate facing Europe.
The key measures relevant in the valence model are public evaluations of the delivery of effective policies on the economy and also in relation to public services such as health care and education. There are indicators of these in the ESS 2010 survey which can be combined into a valence policy scale and this is discussed more fully in the appendix. Given the fact that valence considerations may help to account for wider support for the political system, then public evaluations of the state of democracy and the performance of the government in general are also included as predictors in the analysis.
In contrast to the valence model, the central idea of cognitive engagement theory is the proposition that participation depends on the individual's access to information and on their ability and willingness to use that information to make informed choices about politics and government (Norris, 2000; Dalton, 2005; Clarke et al. 2004 (Verba and Nie, 1972) . It was subsequently applied to the task of explaining participation in a number of different countries (Verba, Nie and Jae-On Kim, 1978; Barnes and Kaase, 1979; Parry, Moyser and Day, 1992; Verba, Schlozman, Brady, 1995) . The central idea of the model is that participation is driven by the individual's resources which underpin their involvement in politics and society. The authors define resources in terms of 'time, money and civic skills' (Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995: 271) . Thus high status individuals rich in these resources will participate more extensively than low status individuals who lack such resources.
In the model the psychological engagement of individuals with politics can also play an important role in influencing participation, and is defined largely in terms of the individual's sense of political efficacy (Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995: 272 (Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995: 272) .
The 2010 ESS has fairly good measures of individual resources, making it possible to identify the respondent's occupational status, their educational background, income and the time they have available for outside activities. However, the survey lacks indicators of political efficacy and also mobilisation, although arguably these are secondary factors when it comes to explaining why people participate.
An alternative interpretation of the relationship between resources and efficacy in the model arises from the comparative analysis of participation in five countries. In this research the authors argued that group resources arising for example from trade union membership could counteract a lack of individual resources. In particular they suggest that: 'organization -and we might add -ideology -is the weapon of the weak' (Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978: 15 ' (1993: 167) . The core idea of social capital theory is that if individuals are embedded in dense social networks which ensure that they interact frequently with other people in a voluntary capacity this will foster interpersonal trust or social capital. This can then be used subsequently to solve common problems. In this sense social capital is like other types of capital and can be used to make society more productive and the economy more efficient.
For many researchers trust is the key indicator of social capital (Fukuyama, 1995 : Putnam, 1993 Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Whiteley, 1999) . Trust is important since it allows individuals to engage in cooperative activities with strangers beyond their immediate family or community. There is a debate about the origins of social capital (Whiteley, 1999) , but the dominant model argues that interactions between individuals in voluntary associations generates interpersonal trust. Communities characterised by high levels of social capital have dense networks of civic engagement and appear to have better health and education, less crime and higher rates of political participation (Putnam, 1993; . By implication they will have more trust in, and support for political parties.
The 2010 ESS contains a battery of three items which measure interpersonal trust and a latent variable can be constructed from them. In addition there is a question asking respondents if they have worked in voluntary organisations during the previous twelve months, which captures one of the drivers of social capital. A third item asks how frequently respondents meet with friends, relatives or colleagues which provide a broad measure of social interaction, so a number of key components of the social capital model -interpersonal trust, voluntary activity and social interactions are reasonably well measured in the survey.
In light of this brief review of the four theoretical models used to explain support for political parties, in the next section we estimate models of party attachment using the 2010 ESS data.
Modelling Partisanship and Trust in Parties in 2010
There are two models, one in which the dependent variable is trust in political parties, and the other individual partisanship. The pooled scores on the trust in parties scale appears in Figure   5 and it is apparent that trust was rather low in these twenty-four countries in 2010 with a mean score of only 3.17 on the scale. Some 19 per cent of respondents gave political parties a trust score of zero, and beyond a score of five trust scores tail off rather rapidly. The result is that only half of one per cent of respondents assigned a score of ten on the trust scale. Figure 6 contains the distribution of scores on the strength of partisanship scale. To measure this respondents' were asked if they felt close to one political party rather than another, and the positive responses to this question appear in Figure 1 . If they replied yes to this question a follow up question then asked how close they were to that party and so the responses to both questions are combined in Figure 6 . With a total of 58 per cent of respondents saying that they did not feel close to any party and a further 1 per cent saying that they did have a preference for a party but did not feel at all close to it, then almost 60 per cent of Europeans can be described as non-partisan in 2010.
-- Figure 6 about here --Trust in political parties and strength of partisanship are both modelled in Table 1 using the various indicators of the valence, cognitive engagement, civic voluntarism and social capital models. The table contains unstandardised coefficients in the first column and standardised coefficients in the second. It is important to note that with more than 45,000 respondents it is relatively easy for coefficients to attain statistical significance in these models, and so the standardised coefficients play a useful role in distinguishing between the variables in terms of their importance for explaining trust and partisanship.
-- Table 1 about here -
The goodness of fit of the party trust model is reasonable for an individual level analysis (R 2 is 0.45). The valence model is the most important one for understanding party trust with all of the variables attaining statistical significance and having large standardised effects. Easily the most important variable, as the standardised coefficients show, is satisfaction with government. This was closely followed by the valence issues scale, and then the satisfaction with democracy variable. Given that the valence model appears to be dominant for explaining trust in parties, it is easy to see why trust has declined in countries which have experienced the worst of the recession. This is fairly strong evidence to suggest that severe economic crisis coupled with an inability of governments to cope with the crisis has directly affected civil society in Europe. It has made people less likely to trust political parties. The effect works through policy dissatisfaction, but also goes beyond that to include concerns about the performance of governments, and also with democracy itself.
It is also apparent that the cognitive engagement model contributes to explaining trust in parties. Media consumption is an important predictor of trust while interest in politics has the strongest effect in that particular model with a standardised coefficient of +0.16. Clearly the politically engaged are more likely to trust political parties than the disengaged.
However, educational attainment also plays a role in the cognitive engagement model and has a negative impact on trust, indicating that the most highly educated are less trusting of parties than the uneducated. This is an anomalous finding in relation to the cognitive engagement model since educational attainment is a positive predictor of participation in the model (Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995; Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, 2004) .
The impact of the civic voluntarism model on party trust is particularly interesting since the signs of the effects are nearly all negative. Thus affluent and highly educated respondents are less likely to trust parties in comparison with their less affluent and educated fellow citizens. Given that we are investigating the influence of social status and its correlates on trust in parties in the middle of the largest economic crisis in Europe since the 1930s, these findings suggests that highly resourced individuals are reacting to this crisis more negatively than their poorly resourced counterparts. The exception to this is the negative impact of hours worked in the week on trust in parties. The expectation is that time poverty caused by excessive working hours reduces political participation, and so this is consistent with the civic voluntarism model. Table 1 suggest that valence considerations play a key role in explaining trust in parties, and they also play a role in explaining partisanship although it is not the dominant role. The cognitive engagement model stands out as the key to understanding partisanship and to a lesser extent the civic voluntarism model.
Up to this point the modelling does not take into account the relationship between party trust and partisanship. Since they are both likely to figure as predictors in the models we examine this issue next.
Interactions between Trust in Parties and Partisanship
The relationship between trust in parties and partisanship is very likely to be interactive with partisanship influencing trust in the first model, and trust influencing partisanship in the second. Given this reciprocal relationship it cannot be accurately estimated using an OLS regression (see Kennedy, 2003: 180-190) . This is because OLS produces biased estimates in models with two-way relationships 4 . To deal with this problem it is necessary to find instrumental variables which can stand in for the two endogenous variables when they appear as predictors. The idea is that if an instrumental variable is, for example, closely correlate with trust in parties but not with partisanship, then it can stand in for trust in parties as a predictor in the partisanship model without producing biased estimates. Theoretical considerations provide a guide to identifying these instrumental variables.
We will utilise two instrumental variables for the party trust measure and a further two for the partisanship measure, coupled with a two stage least squares estimation strategy (see Cameron and Trivedi, 2010, 183-192) . The instruments for party trust are trust in the legislature and trust in the legal systems. Trust in political parties is quite likely to be correlated with trust in other state institutions such as the legislature and the legal system, but there is no obvious reason why partisanship should be influenced by institutional trust in the same way 5 . In the case of partisanship the instruments are party membership and if the respondent worked for a political party in the previous year. Again it is quite likely that party members and volunteers will have strong party attachments, but there is no reason to suppose that trust in parties in general is going to make people join or work for a political party 6 .
-- Table 2 about here -
The two-stage least squares estimates in Table 2 confirm that there is a reciprocal relationship between trust in parties and the strength of partisanship in the models. Strong partisan attachments make people more likely to trust political parties, and equally trust in parties has a positive influence on partisanship. The standardised coefficients in the twostage least squares estimation shows that partisanship has a slightly stronger impact on trust in parties than the latter has on the former. These variables measure different aspects of the public's attitudes to political parties. It is noteworthy that when the variables are added to the two models they do not materially change the size of the other effects appearing in Table 1 , so the four different models of participation continue to be influential in the interactive model.
Party Regulation by the State
To return to the opening theme, the aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between partisanship, trust in parties and the state regulation of political parties. In this section we examine state regulation of political parties. The key argument is that excessive state regulation means that parties will be increasingly captured by the state instead of remaining independent institutions in civil society (Bartolini and Mair, 2001; Kopecky and Mair, 2003; van Biezen, 2004; van Biezen and Kopecky, 2007) . However, it can be argued that the regulation of parties has one of two opposite effects as far as the public are concerned. On the one hand tighter regulation might have the effect of increasing trust in and support for political parties if the public are reassured by such regulation. This is a plausible argument if regulation means that parties will be well-managed, free of corruption and deliver the policies that their supporters want. If so, proximity to the state should enhance their reputations in the minds of the voters.
The other opposite effect is that tight regulation means that the public see parties increasingly as mere extensions of the state bureaucracy, or as part of a state sponsored cartel which is increasingly remote from their concerns. This may not be a problem if the state is seen as well run and effective in delivering policies, but in the context of the serious economic recession facing Europe at the present time, particularly in the Eurozone, states are increasingly seen as being unable to deliver on these policies. It is noteworthy that the average scores on the satisfaction with government and satisfaction with the economy scales for the twenty-one countries surveyed in all five rounds of the European Social Survey were and 4.02 respectively. Needless to say the reductions were much larger in some countries such as Greece and Portugal than in others. Accordingly in these circumstances political parties which appear to be part of a state sponsored cartel will increasingly prove unattractive to many voters, making them appear less trustworthy and weakening their partisan attachments. In this view, regulation will inhibit support for political parties.
The earlier paper on party members used the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) database to measure state regulation of political parties 7 (Whiteley, 2011) .
This database has been greatly expanded and updated and contains many more indicators. A total of thirty-two measures of party regulation are included in the present analysis covering regulations about donations to political parties, the scope and limits of public funding and the reporting requirements imposed on candidates and parties, particularly in relation to elections. A list of the thirty-two measures appears in the appendix and Figure 7 shows that there is considerable variation in the state regulation of parties in these countries.
-- Figure 7 about here - Figure 7 shows that the least regulated party system in these countries is in Switzerland, which has only minimal restrictions on donations to parties and reporting requirements on party activities and expenditure. Interestingly, former communist countries such as Bulgaria and Croatia are among the most regulated party systems with a plethora of rules and reporting requirements applied to them. The Scandinavian countries such as Norway, Sweden and Denmark tend to be lightly regulated as is the Netherlands. In contrast,
southern European countries such as France, Portugal and Greece tend to be more heavily regulated.
-- Figure 8 about here - Figure 8 shows the relationship between the mean party trust scores in the twenty-four countries and the regulation scores. It is strongly negative with a correlation of -0.81, showing that low trust is strongly associated with heavy regulation. Of the two hypotheses discussed earlier it appears that proximity to the state undermines trust in political parties rather than increases it. As to the causal links in this relationship, cross-sectional data cannot definitively answer the question of which came first -regulation or mistrust -but it is evident that these variables are strongly associated. A plausible account in the case of ex-communist countries and former dictatorships in southern Europe is that a legacy of mistrust of parties still present after democratic transition had occurred, ensures that new parties have been heavily regulated even as democracy becomes consolidated.
-- Figure 9 about here - and 2012. This provides a rough measure of the amount of legislative control which has been imposed on political parties in the modern era. Clearly some laws are more important than others and so this is a fairly approximate measure, but it is nonetheless useful for capturing the legislative regulatory environment faced by political parties.
In the event there is a moderate correlation between the number of laws introduced to regulate parties and the scope of regulation measured in the IDEA database in these countries 
Party Trust, Strength of Partisanship and State Regulation
The aggregate measures in Figures 8 and 9 are interesting, but they do not show that individual citizens are less trusting in parties or less partisan as a consequence of regulation.
It would be an ecological fallacy to assume that aggregate relationships imply individual level relationships (Robinson, 1950) , and so we model the effects of state on individual partisanship and trust. Table 3 contains the two-stage least squares estimates of the models of partisanship and party trust at the individual level which incorporates the two aggregate level party regulation measures in a random intercept specification 9 (see Snijders and Bosker, 1999; Raudenbusch and Bryk, 2002) . The impact of regulation at the national level on individuals is captured by the two variables with a specification which implies that they influence the intercepts of the party trust and strength of partisanship models. It is apparent that both the IDEA party regulation index and the Leiden party laws index have a significant negative impact on political trust in these countries, controlling for the other variables in the individual level model. The goodness of fit of the aggregate trust model is high indicating that the effects are highly significant in both cases.
In the case of the strength of partisanship model the IDEA regulation index has a significant negative impact, but the party laws index does not attain significance although the negative sign is consistent with theoretical argument and the findings in the party trust model.
Overall, in the case of partisanship the aggregate effect is much more modest than for trust in parties, but it is nonetheless consistent with the idea that party regulation inhibits both trust and partisanship in these countries.
-- Table 3 about here -
The individual level predictors in the models in Table 3 are very similar to those in Table 2 , indicating that valence considerations play a key role in explaining trust in political parties whereas the cognitive engagement model tends to be more important in the case of partisanship. Thus the addition of the regulation variables to the model does not change the conclusion that performance issues have had the effect of weakening support for parties in Europe.
Discussion and Conclusions
This paper has linked together two important findings in party research, the growing relationship between political parties and the state on the one hand and the decline in voluntary support for political parties among electorates on the other. These findings are not the same as those showing that regulation stifles voluntary activity in political parties, because the decline of voluntary parties is much more ubiquitous than party trust or partisanship. In contrast to volunteering, partisanship and party trust are not declining more or less everywhere. However, support for parties has declined rather precipitously in those countries most strongly hit by recession which has been the main problem facing European countries over the last five years. The individual level modelling suggests that a large part of this is due to growing disillusionment with the ability of governments to deliver on the valence issues such as economic prosperity and personal security.
These results show that the party systems in advanced industrial countries are 3 There is evidence that members of ethnic minorities tend to meet socially more frequently than the population in general and this might explain in part why ethnic minorities tend to trust parties more than the ethnic majority. 4 The reciprocal relationship means that these two endogenous variables are correlated with the error terms in the equation in which they are predictors, making the estimation biased (Kennedy, 2003: 188) . 5 The correlation between trust in parties and trust in the legislature is high (+0.74) as is the correlation between trust in parties and trust in the legal system (+0.59). In contrast the correlation between partisanship and these variables is much weaker (+0.15 and +0.11 respectively). 6 The correlation between partisanship and party membership is +0.22 and between partisanship and working for a party is +0.17. In contrast the correlation between partisanship and trust in the legislature is +0.08 and trust in the legal system is 0. Satisfaction with the economy, education and health care were combined together with a principal components analysis which explained 63.6 per cent of the variance and returned one significant component.
The Cognitive Engagement Model
The media consumption scale combined responses to the following variables:
On an average weekday, how much of your time watching television is spent watching news or programmes about politics and current affairs?
And again on an average weekday, how much of your time listening to the radio is spent listening to news or programmes about politics and current affairs?
And how much of this time is spent reading about politics and current affairs?
The media consumption scale was constructed from a principal components analysis of the three variables which explained 49.2 per cent of the variance and returned once significant component.
Interest in Politics -How interested would you say you are in politics?
The Social Capital Model
The interpersonal trust scale combined responses from the following variables:
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?
Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?
The scale was constructed from a principal components analysis of the three items which explained 69.9 per cent of the variance and returned one significant component.
Voluntary Activity -During the last twelve months have you done any of the following? -Worked in another organisation or association?
Social Contacts -How often do you meet socially with friends, relatives or work colleagues?
The Civic Voluntarism Model
Occupational Status was measured using the iscoco classification of occupations so that: (2000 thru 2470=6) --Professionals (1000 thru 1319=5) -Senior Managers (3000 thru 3480=4) -Skilled White collar occupations (100,4000 thru 4223=3) -Semi-Skilled White collar occupations (5000 thru 8340=2) -Skilled and semi-skilled manual occupations (9000 thru 9330=1) -Unskilled manual occupations Educational Attainment -About how many years of education have you completed, whether full-time or part-time? Please report these in full-time equivalents and include compulsory years of schooling. Ideology -In politics people sometimes talk of "left" and "right". Using this card, where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right Hours worked -Regardless of your basic or contracted hours, how many hours do/did you normally work a week (in your main job), including any paid or unpaid overtime?
Income -Using this card, please tell me which letter describes your household's total income, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources? Religiosity -Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are? 32. What sanctions are provided for political finance infractions?
A positive score for each question scores one, so the scale can theoretically range from zero to thirty-two.
